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Executive Summary
The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications,
auctions, and competition policy. 1 While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we
believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as
efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National
Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt
auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants.
The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to
distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and
loan programs. In this note we explain why procurement auctions are more efficient and
more consistent with the stimulus goals of allocating funds quickly than a traditional grant
review process. We recommend that NTIA/RUS use procurement auctions to distribute at
least part of the stimulus funds.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) requires NTIA/RUS to distribute
$7.2 billion in broadband subsidies. The broadband component of the Act has dual, and not
entirely consistent, objectives of providing immediate economic stimulus and improving
broadband service. NTIA/RUS faces a formidable challenge in determining how to spend
the money quickly and efficiently in ways that meet these goals. The traditional grant
application process is long, complicated, and involves subjective and arbitrary decisions
regarding which projects to fund. In other words, requesting and reviewing grant
applications is not an effective way to implement the plan.
Procurement auctions, in contrast, provide a mechanism that can allocate grant money
quickly, efficiently, and according to well‐defined rules. As a result, procurement auctions
offer NTIA/RUS the most promising method of maximizing broadband improvement while
also creating some level of “temporary, timely, and targeted” stimulus. We therefore
strongly recommend that NTIA/RUS adopt procurement auctions as its preferred method
of distributing grants.
This memo has three parts. First, it explains why the traditional grant application process
is unsuitable for this task and why procurement auctions are better suited. Second, it
sketches out a procurement auction plan. This plan is intended to be a starting point from
which auction design experts would proceed to build and implement a fully functional
auction. Finally, we explain that even if policymakers are skeptical of procurement
auctions, one could be implemented quickly as part of an initial tranche of stimulus funding
in order to test its efficacy relative to traditional approaches. This approach would allow
NTIA/RUS to quickly expand upon or modify the procurement auction program in
subsequent funding rounds.

The analysis and opinions here in are the sole responsibility of the signatories to these comments. The
signatories are not appearing on behalf of any other person or entity and have received no compensation for
the production of these comments.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377523

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................... 1

II.

Procurement Auctions are more Efficient than Traditional Grantmaking Approaches .. 2
A.

Traditional Approaches for Distributing Grants are Cumbersome and Slow ................. 2

B.

Procurement Auctions Can Allocate Funds Flexibly, Efficiently and Fairly ..................... 3

C.

Clear Selection Criteria are Critical for any Selection Program............................................. 4

III.
A Straw‐Man Procurement Auction Plan for Allocating NTIA/RUS Broadband
Subsidies ...................................................................................................................................................................... 5
A.

Auction Design ............................................................................................................................................ 5

B.

Process Considerations ........................................................................................................................... 6

C.

Compliance and Accountability ........................................................................................................... 8

IV.
NTIA/RUS Should Use Procurement Auctions to Allocate a At Least A Portion of the
First Wave of Broadband Stimulus Funding and Expand the Program if Successful ................. 9
V.

Conclusion....................................................................................................................................................... 10

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1377523

I. Introduction
The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications,
auctions, and competition policy. 2 While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we
believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as
efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National
Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt
auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants.
The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to
distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and
loan programs. 3 In this note we explain why procurement auctions are more efficient and
more consistent with the stimulus goals of allocating funds quickly than a traditional grant
review process. We recommend that NTIA/RUS use procurement auctions to distribute at
least part of the stimulus funds. 4
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) requires NTIA/RUS to distribute
$7.2 billion in broadband subsidies. The broadband component of the Act has dual, and not
entirely consistent, objectives of providing immediate economic stimulus and improving
broadband service. NTIA/RUS faces a formidable challenge in determining how to spend
the money quickly and efficiently in ways that meet these goals. The traditional grant
application process is long, complicated, and involves subjective and arbitrary decisions
regarding which projects to fund. In other words, requesting and reviewing grant
applications is not an effective way to implement the plan.
Procurement auctions, in contrast, provide a mechanism that can allocate grant money
quickly, efficiently, and according to well‐defined rules. As a result, procurement auctions
offer NTIA/RUS the most promising method of maximizing broadband improvement while
also creating some level of “temporary, timely, and targeted” stimulus. We therefore
strongly recommend that NTIA/RUS adopt procurement auctions as its preferred method
of distributing grants.
This memo has three parts. First, it explains why the traditional grant application process
is unsuitable for this task and why procurement auctions are better suited. Second, it
sketches out a procurement auction plan. This plan is intended to be a starting point from
which auction design experts would proceed to build and implement a fully functional
The analysis and opinions here in are the sole responsibility of the signatories to these comments. The
signatories are not appearing on behalf of any other person or entity and have received no compensation for
the production of these comments.
3 Section 5a asks: “What mechanisms for distributing stimulus funds should be used by NTIA and USDA in
addition to traditional grant and loan programs?” Section 5b asks: “How would these mechanisms address
shortcomings, if any, in traditional grant or loan mechanisms in the context of the Recovery Act?” Because the
legislation appears to forbid the of use demand‐side vouchers for the vast majority of the stimulus money, we
have focussed on supply‐side mechanisms.
4 The term “reverse auction” has been used in the context of universal service as a synonym for procurement
auction.
2
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auction. Finally, we explain that even if policymakers are skeptical of procurement
auctions, one could be implemented quickly as part of an initial tranche of stimulus funding
in order to test its efficacy relative to traditional approaches. This approach would allow
NTIA/RUS to quickly expand upon or modify the procurement auction program in
subsequent funding rounds.

II. Procurement Auctions are more Efficient than Traditional
Grantmaking Approaches
A. Traditional Approaches for Distributing Grants are Cumbersome and Slow
Traditionally, subsidy programs require firms to submit lengthy applications and the
government to pick the “best ones” after reviewing all the competing applications. This
approach has at least three problems for the purpose of distributing the funds from the
stimulus bill.
First, the traditional approach is inherently time‐consuming. Firms must complete
complex proposals that government officials must subsequently spend time reviewing.
USDA’s Rural Utility Service (RUS), whose awards include broadband support, noted in its
2007 Annual Report that in 2006 the average application took six months to process (and
this was an improvement from previous years when the average processing time was
nearly a year). 5 That estimate does not include time firms spent preparing those
applications. Complex broadband grants have taken far longer—several years in some
instances. 6 Such delays are inconsistent with the goals of speedy stimulus grants.
Second, the qualitative nature of the applications makes it difficult to compare one project
to another. For example, it will be difficult to choose between, say, a fiber project in Texas
and a wireless project in North Dakota. Reviewing and deciding between large numbers of
grant applications will inevitably lead to inconsistent and seemingly arbitrary decisions.
And, the unpredictability of decisions will make it harder for companies to determine and
propose the most appropriate projects.
Third, it is difficult to design a grant application system to ensure that firms receive only
the minimum subsidy necessary to achieve a goal. To determine the “correct” subsidy level
the government could attempt to calculate the necessary subsidy using available
information, but this effort would be time‐intensive, costly, and inaccurate. Alternatively, it
could rely on the applicant’s own estimate, but applicants have little incentive to ask for the
bare minimum required. Either approach will result in a suboptimal allocation of subsidy
dollars.
USDA Rural Utility Service. 2007. USDA Rural Development: Bringing Broadband to Rural America.
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rd/pubs/RDBroadbandRpt.pdf
6 Open Range Communications disclosed that it had spent over three years and submitted over 30,000 pages
of application materials before its RDUP loan was granted. See
http://www.businesswire.com/news/google/20071022006575/en
5
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Reviewing grant applications is not an appropriate way to distribute broadband stimulus
grants. NTIA/RUS requires a more objective and efficient methodology. Competitive
bidding by procurement auction is the best approach.

B. Procurement Auctions Can Allocate Funds Flexibly, Efficiently and Fairly
An objective, ”mechanistic” approach that applies specific, quantitative criteria can be both
easier to implement and lead to more efficient outcomes than traditional grant application
review. Procurement auctions, in particular, can lead to more efficient grant disbursal than
traditional qualitative approaches. 7
An auction is a mechanism for making smart allocation choices when confronted with
overwhelming amounts of information and no relevant market exists. In a typical auction
for a good, bids increase until the auction identifies the entity willing to pay the most for
the good being auctioned. In the simplest procurement or “reverse” auction, bids consist of
how much an entity must be paid to provide a good or service. The procurement auction
thus identifies the entity willing to provide the good or service for the smallest amount of
money.
Though it may sound exotic, a procurement auction is just a competitive bidding process
and analogous to any government procurement. When the government needs to purchase
something, it describes specifically what it wants, firms submit bids to provide the service,
and the government picks the firm that submits the best bid. 8 The best bid may be the
lowest, but the government may also take other factors into account when making the
decision, especially in the case of complex projects. 9
In procurement auctions for broadband, the government would specify its objective and
ask firms to bid for the right to meet that objective. Consider, for example, a rural area with
no broadband service. The government can ask firms to bid for a subsidy that would make
it profitable for the firm to provide service. Firms and other organizations would compete
against each other by bidding down the subsidy they need to offer service. The firm that
commits to provide broadband in that area for the smallest subsidy would win the grant.
Procurement auctions have several advantages over traditional methods of distributing
grants. First, once the auction rules are in place they relieve the government of the task of
7 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Congress realized more than a decade ago that the

traditional proposal‐review approach was inefficient. Historically the FCC had granted spectrum licenses
based on comparative hearings. These hearings could not be done quickly and put the FCC in the impossible
position of processing tractor trailer‐loads of paperwork to decide which companies were best suited to
providing services in a given spectrum band. In 1994, the FCC began to allocate spectrum via auctions, which
could occur quickly and allocate spectrum far more efficiently than could any administrative comparative
process. This model has been used successfully in the U.S. and around the world ever since.
8 See some federal procurement guidelines here: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/index_guides.html
9 While it is easier to conduct this process for simple products, the government also uses it to supply highly
complex goods like weapons systems See, for example,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/business/worldbusiness/10tanker.html?fta=y and www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-06-364.
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identifying the “best” projects – the government sets forth its objectives in advance of the
auction. This also enables and encourages bidders to tailor their projects to the
government’s actual criteria. Second, because auctions use competition among providers to
determine the subsidy required to achieve any particular goal, the government does not
have to estimate the subsidy actually required for any given project. Reducing the subsidy
for any given project frees up money that can be used for additional projects. Finally, they
inherently induce firms to contribute their own investment to increase the chance that
their bid is accepted. 10

C. Clear Selection Criteria are Critical for any Selection Program
Crucial to the success of any plan, not just procurement auctions, is having clear objectives.
In the case of the broadband stimulus the objectives include creating new jobs and
improving broadband. It is not possible to maximize both objectives simultaneously. From
the language of the Act and public discussions about it thus far we can assume that the
most important objective is to maximize new broadband availability subject to creating
some minimum level of new economic activity.
In general, stimulus funds would be awarded to those bidders that maximize broadband
expansion with the lowest subsidy amount. Through the auction process bidders would be
able to “bid down” the subsidy as they compete with other bidders seeking the same
stimulus dollars.
Careful auction design is crucial to ensuring an efficient outcome. It is important to keep in
mind two general points. First, the criteria on which the bids will be scored or ranked must
be clear. As a simple example, bids could consist of subsidy requested per household
connected or per household to which broadband service is newly available. 11 Then bids
could be ranked from smallest subsidy requested to the largest, and funds distributed
according to that ranking.
Second, the ability to “game” the procurement process increases with the ambiguity of the
rules and the number of criteria included in a bid. For example, an auction in which firms
had to demonstrate that their bid was in the “public interest” and specify a subsidy per
household, the number of new households served, the service speeds, reliability, latency,
mobility, and price would probably not work well due to the ambiguity of what, exactly,
“public interest” means and the large number of criteria on which firms bid.

10 Procurement auctions are sound and have been used successfully around the world to bring

telecommunications services to areas that previously had none. Experiences in other countries, including
Australia, India, Chile, Peru, and others demonstrate that procurement auctions can substantially bring down
the subsidies required to induce buildout. Their experiences also teach us that it will be important to get the
details right.
11 It will be important not to confuse supply and demand for broadband. About half of all people without
broadband say that they are not interested in it. Because the stimulus focuses primarily on supply, we may
want to focus on newly available broadband as opposed to newly adopted.
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Note that the need to identify unambiguous, simple criteria on which to judge bids in
advance of the auction is actually an advantage, not a disadvantage, of procurement
auctions. It may appear at first blush that traditional grant reviews do not face similar
problems, but that is incorrect. If a grant review process does not undergo the same
identification task then it will likely lead to arbitrary and inconsistent decisions.
In addition to those very general points, this auction must be designed in a way that does
not arbitrarily benefit one technology over another. Organizations could, therefore, bid to
upgrade copper services in order to make DSL feasible, upgrade or install coaxial cable to
facilitate cable broadband, or upgrade or install wireless and satellite broadband
equipment. With scoring rules set out in advance bidders could know how they would
have to bid and consider competing technologies or providers in other geographic areas.

III. A Straw‐Man Procurement Auction Plan for Allocating NTIA/RUS
Broadband Subsidies
A. Auction Design
This section describes economic methodology and other considerations for devising an
effective procurement auction program. The detailed rules of the auction will be crucial, as
they will affect the outcome. 12 NTIA/RUS will have to make several decisions as it creates
these rules. We list some of the issues below.
The first step is the same for both a procurement auction and a traditional grant review
process: NTIA/RUS must identify and define unserved and underserved regions. Ideally,
most of these regions would be specified to have similar numbers of
unserved/underserved households, so that the service costs across regions can be easily
compared, and to be just large enough that projects of that scale are meaningful to the
bidders. NTIA/RUS could identify these areas using existing data or bidders could propose
and certify unserved areas. Each eligible project would need to offer qualifying service to
at least 95% of the unserved households in the region. 13
Having defined either the regions or the mechanism for defining the regions, the rules for
the procurement auction begin to diverge from the traditional grant review process.
NTIA/RUS should set out a framework for scoring projects in terms of a standard unit of
supply. This could be a simple metric, such as “newly served population” (defined as the
population to which service above a minimum bandwidth threshold is newly available) or a
more involved measure such as “effective bandwidth supplied” (defined as the population
12 If there is enough time, it would be useful to design experiments to test auction rules. In section III, we
suggest allocating the money in tranches to learn about the process and make changes based on those
outcomes.

The required percentage of homes in the area could be set at a different level, or it could be set by the
bidders and scored as part of the auction evaluation.

13
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to which service is newly available adjusted for the speed of service. 14 ) Each bid would be
characterized in terms of effective supply and cost. We advise against introducing
additional dimensions to the evaluation. It is particularly problematic to introduce
subjective criteria, which undermine the quick and objective comparisons required by an
effective auction.
In a sealed‐bid auction, the winning bids maximize the total effective supply, subject to the
government’s spending and other constraints.
Ideally, the government would include multiple regions with a limited budget in a single
auction, in order to encourage competition among bidders offering diverse services in
different areas. Particularly in large auctions, the government should allow bidders to
specify a maximum number of projects that they might win from any non‐overlapping sets
of projects and a further maximum for collections of such sets of projects. By protecting
bidders from the risk of winning too many projects in any set and overall, this feature
encourages firms to submit additional proposals, increasing the level of competition.
Auctions are adaptable to respect a wide range of policy concerns. The government could
use instruments similar to ones that have been employed in FCC auctions, such as limiting
the number of projects won by any single bidder or offering bidding credits to small
businesses. And, to spread the effects of the subsidy geographically, the government could
give greater weight to the first households served in a state or region than to additional
households.
We recommend that pay‐as‐bid pricing applies: winning bidders should provide the project
and receive the subsidy described in their bids. This system is simple and pay‐as‐bid
pricing is common in procurement auctions.
The variations we have described relate to characteristics of the bidder or the region being
served. It is easy in principle to add other sorts of factors to the bidding menu. However,
the more dimensions on which firms bid, the more likely it becomes that there are easy
ways for firms to game the system. We recommend limiting the factors to price and
effective supply, especially in the first implementation to test the auction system. With a
straightforward first step, auctions can be implemented rapidly and realize most of the
competitive benefits from moving to this type of system.

B. Process Considerations
As a threshold matter, procurement auctions are allowed under ARRA. The Broadband
Technology Opportunities Program was established to provide “competitive grants.” 15
While ARRA does not separately define the term “competitive grant,” procurement auctions
14 An adjustment factor would reward bidders for providing higher speed service to unserved population. For
example, 1 mbps service could have a factor of 1, 10 mbps a factor of 1.5, 50 mbps, a factor of 2 and 100 mbps,
a factor of 3.
15 ARRA, Sec. 6001(g).
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are simply a methodology for implementing a competitive grant program, and in this
respect should be seen as the fairest and most transparent way of doing so. 16
The framework around which an effective procurement auction can be built is simple, and
immediately suggests where substantial improvements over traditional grant review or
other types of procurement auction can be made.
Indication of Intent and Prescreening. In order to avoid an extended post‐
bidding process of weeding out and correcting frivolous bidding and overbidding, a
procurement auction process must include a pre‐bid indication of intent from prospective
bidders and a simple prescreening process. Prescreening could be as simple as a statement
committing to meet all requirements of ARRA and the procurement auction rules, coupled
with a showing that the bidder can (1) meet ARRA’s 20% contribution requirement and (2)
pay debts up to the subsidies it receive. 17
Substantive Preconditions. In order to limit the considerations for award as much
as possible, everything extraneous to price should be made a precondition to bid – that is,
any bid will assume the preconditions and any cost of compliance to be included in the bid.
Doing so will increase transparency and limit the subjectivity of the final decision‐making
process. For example, in implementing the open access requirement, NTIA should set its
rule and require bidders to meet it – bids that do not comply with the rule will be rejected.
Allowing bidders to opt out of specific substantive requirements would invite gaming and
undermine the objectivity of the procurement auction, removing the rationale for using an
auction in the first place. Thus, NTIA should establish specific requirements for how it
wants bidders to meet the substantive requirements set forth in Section 6001(e) through
(h) of ARRA. Moreover, bids that fail to include clear metrics and reporting intervals
consistent with these requirements should be rejected.
Combinatorial Bids and Trading. Just as ARRA requires that competitive grants
be technologically neutral, the size and scope of bidders has also been left open. Indeed,
ARRA appears to encourage a broad range of types and sizes of bidders. This range reflects
an underlying emphasis in ARRA’s broadband sections on flexibility and creativity – letting
the market figure out the best way of allocating funds and expanding broadband. Rules for
procurement auctions should further the goal of flexibility by making clear that bidders
may combine to serve specific areas, or combine areas, as their bids may specify.
Furthermore, subject to full compliance with implementing rules, NTIA should allow rights
to receive the subsidy, once won, to be freely traded. Winners should be allowed to
subcontract or transfer their obligation to another entity that would have otherwise been
qualified to bid in the original auction. A precondition for a workable trading system,
however, is that there are clear and enforced benchmarks and buildout expectations.
16 For a regulation to survive a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act, a court must conclude that

the regulation was not “arbitrary and capricious” or an “abuse of discretion.” Given the benefits of using
procurement auctions to distribute competitive grants, and ARRA’s clear emphasis on speedy distribution of
grants, an agency deciding to distribute funds under ARRA that opted for a less efficient and less transparent
method would likely be required to explain what other factors made its decision reasonable.
17 In order to avoid tipping their hands too early, a series of ranges of subsidies can be established, with the
rules specifying that combined bids would be assumed to be able to meet the total of the combined ranges.
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Provided that the underlying build out and other performance requirements are met,
creating a trading system will allow winners to consolidate or diversify their obligations in
a rational and efficient manner.
Transparency of Information. To the maximum extent possible, and consistent
with how other auctions such as spectrum auctions have been conducted, information
about the winning bidder or bidders, the amounts bid, and performance assurances must
be made public and easily accessible online. It has already been established that
transparency of information in a procurement auction does not violate any confidentiality
of bidders that might otherwise be protected under the Federal Procurement Regulations.
18 Accordingly, NTIA should make this explicit in its implementing regulations, and explain
that transparency of the process is essential not only to ensure fairness of the auction itself
but also to aid in compliance.

C. Compliance and Accountability
Any subsidy or procurement plan—auction or otherwise—must include a strong
mechanism for determining that firms fulfill their obligations. Performance and related
assurances, such as performance bonds and other mechanisms apply to any grant program
and are not unique to procurement auctions. No matter what mechanism NTIA might
choose to allocate competitive grants, it will still have to address compliance and auditing.
To some extent, simple prescreening of bidders will address compliance issues by ensuring
that only serious bidders are engaging in the process. However, NTIA must also apply
traditional performance assurance mechanisms, which are briefly discussed here.
It may be possible to require winning firms to put money in escrow that will be returned to
them once they can certify that they have met their obligations (or returned in tranches as
they show progress towards the goal). Forfeiture bonds are another approach. The auction
design itself may be an important factor in determining whether post‐auction obligations
are met.
Winning bidders must make good on their bids. Holding them accountable and making
sure that the subsidy actually created new economic activity requires two conditions to be
true.
First, the firm must undertake the promised investment within a specified period of time.
The firm should be given part of the subsidy immediately so that it can begin construction
and receive the remainder in increments related to the number of households to which it
has provided access. Firms that do not meet the promises made in their bids should be
penalized to ensure that they have sufficient incentive to meet their obligations.
Second, the investment must not have occurred without the subsidy. Whether the
investment is inframarginal is very difficult to know and it may not be possible to
determine the answer conclusively for any given firm. Nevertheless, evaluating the
outcome may make it possible to discern the amount of new investment created.
18 Matter of: MTB Group, Inc., 2005 WL 433615, 2005 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 34 (2006)
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IV. NTIA/RUS Should Use Procurement Auctions to Allocate a At Least
A Portion of the First Wave of Broadband Stimulus Funding and
Expand the Program if Successful
We realize that using competitive auctions for disbursing subsidy grants may be viewed as
a change in process and that there may be some risk. As such, if auctions are not used for
the entire subsidy process, we think that at least some real world analysis should take
place to see how auctions perform compared to the traditional process rather than
rejecting auctions completely. This section describes how such an incremental approach to
using auctions could be implemented in the grant system.
As NTIA/RUS have indicated, the stimulus awards are likely to be awarded over time. We
believe that that NTIA/RUS would be wise to disburse broadband grants in successive
waves or rounds, so that it can improve its disbursal mechanisms iteratively throughout
the lifecycle of the program. Within this context, we recommend that NTIA/RUS designate
one or more geographical regions in which the first wave of funds is distributed exclusively
through a procurement auction process.
This approach sets up a natural experiment allowing comparison of procurement auctions
to the traditional approach. If the experiment is successful, the procurement auction
mechanism can be expanded in scope to encompass other regions and stimulus dollars
(potentially all remaining stimulus funds). Regardless of what mechanism is ultimately
used, the lessons from the procurement auction pilot will help NTIA/RUS to learn and
adapt its award mechanisms.
A procurement auction can be implemented quickly. While there are many options for
designing the auction system, that fact should not serve as an argument against auctions:
auctions can be implemented rapidly. In fact, auctions may take a little more time to design
upfront than a generic submission system, but the investment upfront is likely to speed the
overall process because it will make selection much more rapid and less arbitrary (and
hence less subject to ex post litigation). Other countries have proposed and implemented
procurement auctions for universal service rapidly and successfully. 19
One way to use auctions for a portion of the first wave of stimulus grants would be to
divide the country into large geographical regions. The “Regional Economic Area
Grouping” (REAG) used by the FCC in spectrum auctions is one possible scheme to
consider. In this scheme, the continental United States is divided into six regions, each
containing roughly 50 million citizens and encompassing both rural and urban areas. An
alternative would be to designate similarly‐sized regions as aggregations of states.
Whatever scheme is used, it is important that the regions are roughly similar in terms of
population size and urban/rural mix.

See Wallsten, Scott, “Reverse Auctions and Universal Telecommunications Service: Lessons from Global
Experience” Federal Communications Law Journal. http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v61/no2/9‐
WALLSTENFINAL.pdf

19
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Then, in the first wave of stimulus disbursal, regions consisting of one‐third of the U.S.
population (roughly 100 million citizens) would be served through procurement auction of
stimulus funds. The remaining two‐thirds would be served by a conventional grant review
process. A timeline would be established requiring that the first wave of funds—whether
by procurement auction or by traditional grant review—shall be completed within six
months. The amount of funding allocated to the first wave should reflect a practical
assessment of what is feasible to disburse using the traditional process in a six‐month
timeframe. At the end of the period, the NTIA/RUS should take one month to compare
results of the two programs and to assess the results, before making a determination
whether to use procurement auctions in subsequent rounds.
Should NTIA/RUS decide to continue or expand the use of procurement auctions, the
mechanism can be tweaked to incorporate lessons from the first wave. However, even if
NTIA/RUS decides to proceed through entirely conventional means, the procurement
auction will undoubtedly provide important lessons (e.g., bidder receptiveness to
quantitative targets) that will inform refinements to the conventional approach.

V. Conclusion
A traditional grant application review process may prove to be inadequate to the herculean
task of distributing broadband stimulus grants. It is likely to be slow, cumbersome, and
will result in a suboptimal allocation of resources. By contrast, competitive bidding,
through the use of procurement auctions, can allocate the funds quickly and efficiently.
While we advocate using procurement auctions to distribute all of the broadband stimulus
money, allocating even a portion of the funds using procurement auctions would be useful
as an experiment. At a minimum, the broadband stimulus funds present a golden
opportunity to implement rigorous evaluation techniques, which will generate knowledge
that can be applied to other current and future programs. To that end it is important to
include procurement auctions as one approach to be tested.
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